Construction and monetary policy: a view from the sidelines by Sandra Pianalto
The Federal Reserve’s popularity in
the business community is as high as it
has been in the 15 years I’ve been in the
System, and perhaps as high as ever in
our 86-year history. I often hear someone
say, “The Fed sure is doing a good job.” 
As Chief Operating Officer of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland, I’m
tempted to interpret such a compliment
as a statement about how efficient we
have become at clearing checks. And
indeed we have. But that isn’t what you
mean, is it?
Do you mean that the Fed is monitoring
banks effectively, providing leadership
in electronic payments development, and
working hard to ensure that all financial
institutions are Y2K compliant well
before New Year’s Eve? We are, you
know, but these accomplishments don’t
usually get us noticed in the business
community. 
Perhaps “doing a good job” means that
we are providing the world with one of
its best known and most confidently used
products, the dollar. And so we are. But I
doubt this is what accounts for our recent
popularity—at least not directly.
No, I am sure that satisfaction with the
central bank reflects happiness over busi-
ness conditions. You are prospering, and
have been, for one of the longest uninter-
rupted periods in modern U.S. history.
Here, in my hometown, we’ve seen the
rate of joblessness fall to less than 4 per-
cent of the labor force. A remarkable
level when you consider that this is ½ of
1 percentage point under the very low
U.S. average—and in a region that, just
a decade ago, had an average rate of
unemployment that was 1½ percentage
points higher than the national average.
For some reason, the business commu-
nity is quick to give us the credit. Or per-
haps I’ve said that backwards. It is often
supposed that the Federal Reserve has
given borrowers, and your industry in
particular, access to relatively cheap
credit, which has allowed our economy
to grow. If this is what “doing a good
job” means regarding the performance
of the Federal Reserve, then it’s a back-
handed compliment at best.
Judging the performance of monetary
policy is like judging the quality of NFL
officiating (an especially apt analogy
tonight, just four days before Super
Bowl XXXIII). Officiating is best when
it is noticed least—when the game is
what generates the thrills, not therules
of the game. If part of the crowd heaps
praise on officials, it’s generally in
response to a decisive call that helps
create a wished-for outcome. And that,
of course, implies that there is another,
unhappy group to whom the officials’
call seems less clearheaded.
Indeed, for all the wonderful compli-
ments we have received from the busi-
ness community recently, the Fed has
gotten less-than-glorious reviews from
pensioners and others on fixed incomes
who believe that low interest rates have
created a hardship for them. Like a foot-
ball referee, I might be inclined to say
that we call ’em as we see ’em. In what I
will refer to as the “conventional view”
of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve
is often presumed to be the judge of
what the “right” amount of credit in the
economy should be.
But here the analogy breaks down. We
are not the arbiters of credit; the finan-
cial system is. A better analogy, I think,
is that we are the makers of the monetary
football. That thing you pass back and
forth between you. It’s a crucial part of
the business game to be sure, but a pas-
sive part. I’ve been at many football
games and not once have I heard some-
one say, “Wow, what a great ball.” It
goes unnoticed, and the players take for
granted its constancy, its sameness, its
predictable shape and size.
I wonder if football manufacturers are
ever tempted to make the ball a bit
smaller to give the offense a boost. Or
maybe they’d like to let some air out of
the ball and turn things in favor of the
defense. Thankfully, rules prevent the
ball from varying from contest to con-
test. The caretakers of the NFL want the
game to be about the athletics on the
field, not about the whims of those who
provide the footballs. This is precisely
why many of us in the Federal Reserve
System would like to see Congress give
the central bank a single objective—the
attainment of price stability—so that
you can take for granted the predictabil-
ity and consistency of the dollar.
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The invitation I received billed tonight’s
event as an “annual forecast meeting.”
And I clearly understand your expecta-
tions for my remarks: The health of the
construction industry is sensitive to the
level and direction of interest rates; you
would like me, as a representative of the
Federal Reserve, to tell you what those
interest rates will be. On this score, I’m
afraid I must disappoint you. Not be-
cause there’s a deep secret that I can’t
disclose, but because of a popular mis-
conception about what the Fed actually
does and how it does it.
I do not doubt that credit availability
may be the single most important factor
in the near-term outlook for your indus-
try. But how, exactly, do we control the
amount of credit in financial markets?
The conventional view of monetary pol-
icy explains the process something like
this: If the Federal Reserve believes the
economy is overheating (or, in econo-
mists’ vernacular, “operating beyond its
potential”), then it drains reserves from
the banking system. This, in turn, drives
up interest rates, and the higher rates
cool the economy off. On the other hand,
if we think the economy needs a little
perking up, then the conventional view
would have us do the opposite—add
reserves to the banking system, push
interest rates downward, and in so doing
boost economic growth.
This conventional view of monetary pol-
icy has at least two major shortcomings.
To begin with, its adherents would have
you believe that the economy is inher-
ently unstable and, if left alone, is
doomed to unnecessarily long periods of
unemployment and stagnation. It is the
job of the Federal Reserve, they say, to
ensure that the economy marches to a
steady, more predictable beat.
I have a more optimistic view of the
marketplace. I believe it marches to a
beat of its own making, and the best
judges of its tempo are the entrepreneurs
and laborers whose efforts are the origin
of its growth.
My second dispute with the conven-
tional view of monetary policy concerns
the notion that we can control interest
rates in such a way as to determine the
spending behavior of borrowers. I
object to this for essentially the same
reason—because I think that the interest
rates that influence economic growth
(what economists call “real” interest
rates) are set in the marketplace through
the negotiations of investors who supply
capital to the credit market and the
entrepreneurs who use that capital to
fund business expansion. 
The conventional view has popular ap-
peal because people don’t always make
the necessary distinction between nomi-
nal and real values. By altering the
amount of reserves, we alter the supply
of money, which is distinct from credit.
By changing the supply of money rela-
tive to its demand, we change the pur-
chasing power of a dollar. That is, we
change all measurements based on dol-
lars. In other words, we create money,
not wealth; a dollar is only a measure-
ment of wealth. 
Perhaps an example would be useful.
Suppose you live in a 3,000-square-foot
house, but you want more space. One
thing you could do is to build a larger
house. This takes resources: lumber,
concrete, drywall, and the knowledge to
put them together. If, after all this effort,
you had added 1,300 more square feet of
living space, you would be happier
because you would have made a real
gain in your standard of living.
Alternatively, suppose the government
wanted to help you out a bit. While they
might not take on any of the burden of
building a new house, they could easily
change the number of square feet in your
present home by redefining the foot. The
Bureau of Weights and Measures in
Washington, D.C. could decide that from
now on, the U.S. foot is to contain only
10 inches. They would then rightly note
that your house, formerly 3,000 square
feet, is now a little more than 4,300
square feet! It has grown by the same
amount as before, but without any of the
mortar, nails, or sweat!
Of course, as you walk through your
home you are sure to notice that your
new 4,300-square-foot house looks the
same as the old 3,000-square-foot model.
In fact, they are the same; all that has
changed is the standard by which we
measure space. Since the new foot con-
tains just 10 inches, your house has
changed in nominal value only. Every-
thing real remains as it was. 
No doubt this example seems absurd to
you, but no more so than talk about
increasing wealth through monetary pol-
icy seems to me. By altering the supply
of dollars in the marketplace, we do not
alter real values but only measured val-
ues. We create the illusion of growth and
prosperity, not the real thing, and then
come to regret it. Once we learn that our
wealth has not grown in real terms, but
rather that the dollar has shrunk, we
must reverse all the bad decisions that
were based on that erroneous measure-
ment. Further, we must protect the dollar
from further debasement.
Here the distinction between nominal
and real interest rates becomes crucial.
Credit markets want to be rewarded for
providing entrepreneurs with credit.
That is the real interest rate. But they
also want to be paid back in dollars that
have the same purchasing power as the
ones they lent out. So the interest rate
will also have an inflation premium in it,
making nominal rates somewhat higher
than real ones. Finally, because lenders
know that the value of the dollar can
change at the whim of monetary policy,
an added bit of risk must be priced into
the real interest rate, something financial
analysts call the inflation risk premium. 
The only way the Federal Reserve can
lower real interest rates predictably and
sustainably is by eliminating the threat
of inflation from the contract between
borrowers and lenders. In short, an
accurate, steady dollar may be the most
indispensable tool used in the construc-
tion industry.
n n    The Outlook
What about tonight’s subject, the out-
look for the economy? We all know that
economic forecasting falls somewhere
between rocket science and the occult,
but I’d like to note an especially curious
fact: In 1998, economists underpre-
dicted the overall U.S. growth rate for
the sixth consecutive year. Persistent,
large misses like this should make us
cautious about attaching too much sig-
nificance to economic predictions.
But maybe we ask the wrong questions
of an economic forecast. Let me go back
to an example from football. When the
season began, few gurus saw the Atlanta
Falcons in the Super Bowl. Why? Be-
cause an enormous, indeed an uncount-
able, number of factors determine which
teams win and which lose, and many of
these factors are simply unpredictable.
I believe that the value added by an an-
nual forecast meeting comes not only,
and perhaps not even primarily, from theultimate accuracy of the forecast. The
forecast provides a framework for evalu-
ating our risks, and this dinner is an op-
portunity to weigh the risks before us and
debate alternative strategies for con-
fronting them.
Consider what economists are telling us
about 1999.  Next month, the economy
will have completed its eighth consecu-
tive year of growth. Still, economists
are holding to the view that our expan-
sion in business activity will moderate
somewhat sharply this year. But there is
scant data to indicate that such a slow-
ing has begun or soon will. Indeed, on
Friday [January 29], we are likely to get
a GDP report indicating that, at year’s
end, the economy was growing at an
annualized pace exceeding 4 percent—
well above what most would consider a
typical growth rate.
The key to whether the economy can
continue its string of unusually large
growth rates, it seems to me, is the ulti-
mate strength of U.S. capital expansion
—our enormous and virtually unprece-
dented growth in construction and the
production of machinery. Your industry,
residential construction, has been an im-
portant variable in the national growth
equation in recent years. Last year, resi-
dential construction almost certainly
topped 4 percent of GDP, its largest con-
tribution to the economy in a decade. But
according to the consensus view, U.S.
housing starts are expected to be about
1.54 million units in 1999, a 4 percent
drop-off from last’s year record. And
economists on average see U.S. housing
construction falling another 4 percent
next year.
What factors have gone into this rather
lackluster projection? It’s hard to see in
the industry’s economic fundamentals.
The December surveys of homebuilders
and homebuyers revealed unusually
positive assessments of homebuying
conditions, and favorable housing
“affordability” indicators are generally
expected to persist well into the year
2000. In fact, economic forecasters
expect long-term interest rates to fall
modestly from their current levels, at
least over the next two years. Further-
more, joblessness is low and productiv-
ity growth continues to make solid
gains; the combined influence of the two
is expected to keep income growth in the
U.S. economy reasonably strong over
the forecast horizon.
I suspect that the soft residential con-
struction numbers in the consensus fore-
cast have more to do with basic arithme-
tic than economic fundamentals. Despite
their outward sophistication, forecasts
rely heavily on averages. If the economy
goes through a period of better-than-
average growth, such as we have seen in
this industry over the past few years,
economic forecasts almost invariably
project a less-than-average performance
until the economy returns to its historical
trend. After all, the average must be
maintained.
Returning to our football analogy: The
Atlanta Falcons surprised the football
world by winning five of their first six
games. Quite an accomplishment for a
team that traditionally wins about half its
contests and that won only three games
two years ago. Did this year’s strong start
cause analysts to predict that Atlanta
would lose five of their next six games?
No. Analysts reacted, as would any stu-
dent of statistics, by predicting that they
would play according to their history and
win half of their remaining games. 
But even this proved an overly pes-
simistic outlook, and Atlanta closed the
season by winning nine of their last 10
games. Come playoff time, some pre-
dicted that Atlanta’s “luck” would run
out—a rational response if one weighs
the Falcons’ long history too heavily.
There is a forecasting lesson here. Aver-
ages are of little use when fundamental
changes are introduced into the economic
system. Consider the year just past. If
you had asked economists in 1997 what
they were expecting for 1998—and we
did—they would have said 1.42 million
units, a small drop from the strong 1996
rate of 1.48 million units. You see, that 
4 percent decline I told you they are pro-
jecting for this year was the general view
for 1998 as well. But last year’s starts
came in at a phenomenal 7½ percent
increase over the 1997 level! And in
1996, economists projected a 1.39 mil-
lion unit pace—again a retreat from the
good growth of the year before—only to
be surprised by a 1.48-million-start
result. The fact is that economists have
seriously underestimated housing con-
struction activity for each of the past
three years.
Persistent misses like this indicate that
something fundamental is changing the
U.S. economic landscape and it’s having
a dramatic impact on the construction
trades. We euphemistically refer to these
changes as “the technological revolu-
tion,” which is generally thought to be
about the power of computers. And that
may be its origin. But the key word in
the phrase is really revolution. We are
rapidly transforming how we go about
doing what we do, where we do it, and
with whom. The revolution has radically
altered the relationships that bind manu-
facturers to retailers, retailers to con-
sumers, workers to jobs, and yes, fami-
lies to houses.
These breaks from our observed history
introduce a great deal of uncertainty or
risk into the outlook, and there seems to
be even more uncertainty in the current
housing market outlook than is typical in
this very volatile industry. When we
examine the range of publicly available
forecasts, we find that the 10 most pes-
simistic ones see housing starts falling
by nearly 9 percent from 1998—a
decline of almost recessionary magni-
tude. But the economic optimists are
projecting that the industry will grow by
more than 5 percent in real terms during
the next year, another new record high
for the industry. 
Some of the risk we face tonight comes
from circumstances outside the U.S.
economy. While this country continues
to move strongly and steadily ahead,
many of our major foreign trading 
partners have seen economic growth
amounting to less than half of ours. The
economies of Japan, Korea, and much
of South America are at best flat and, in
most cases, still shrinking. These weak-
nesses have begun to affect certain seg-
ments of the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Not only have our exports to these
nations dried up, but now these nations
are fierce competitors. America’s steel,
chemicals, and textiles industries have
all seen production levels drop sharply
since August in the face of a brutal for-
eign economic environment.
I don’t deny that these international
issues cause significant problems in
companies and communities. Certainly
those of us who have lived in this city
for any length of time remember the
plant closings and unemployment asso-
ciated with the changes in the worldwide
rubber and tire industry. But our eco-
nomic system has tremendous resiliency,
which manifests itself in several ways.
For example, the economic weakness
that has characterized Japan and other
nations has caused the prices of basicconstruction commodities, like lumber
and steel, to remain low, despite the U.S.
building boom. Perhaps even more
importantly, our weakening trade bal-
ance implies that investment dollars—
which had been flowing abroad—are
now flowing back to the United States.
More savers, quite simply, make for
lower interest rates, and this too has had
a positive, unpredicted influence on the
construction industry.
n n    Conclusion
In the past, the great unknowns facing
your industry rarely came from the in-
ternational environment. They came
from government policy or, more to the
point, from changes in that policy. Al-
ternating tax treatments of structures
have been both the boon and the bane 
of the construction market—more bane
than boon, I would guess.
And fiscal policy is certainly not alone
in this criticism. Using the monetary
authority to “manage” the level of con-
struction activity is fraught with peril.
At best, policy’s effectiveness is unpre-
dictable and temporary. In the end,
“easy” money policy causes interest
rates to rise, not fall—and construction
to languish, not flourish.
When we conceive of monetary policy
in this light, we focus on the appropriate
role of the central bank in creating
wealth. If the Federal Reserve has con-
tributed to the revolution driving our
economy, and this industry in particular,
it has done so only by providing the
nation with a steadier measure of value.
In this way, the unnecessary risk pre-
mium in capital market interest rates
caused by inflation uncertainty has been
reduced. This—not easy money—has
made credit cheaper.
Creating an environment of steady
prices has helped to liberate the invest-
ment potential of the nation, opening up
previously unobtainable trade opportu-
nities abroad and encouraging more
research and development. In other
words, reducing the risks associated
with an uncertain purchasing power of
money has made more room for other
risks, those associated with entrepre-
neurial inspiration.
One day monetary policy may achieve
the status of the football and become a
passive rather than an active participant
in the economy. I will know when that
day arrives, because the business head-
lines will not be about the Federal
Reserve or monetary policy but about
you—the builders and other investors
who are now, and always have been, the
real source of economic prosperity.
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